The only time I met Mr. Fogarty was at a Congress in Rome; I was impressed by his linguistic ability and by his first–hand knowledge of the Christian Trade Union movement. These qualities are displayed in this magnificent book, as regards which I am a learner rather than a reviewer. None but he—with his travels, his personal contacts, his encyclopedic knowledge of the literature—could have written this book. He defines Christian Democracy as “the movement of those who, having regard to (...) the Christian revelation, accept the personalist and pluralist principles” which, in the context of the world to–day, involve the acceptance of political democracy, joint responsibility in industry, the Freedom of Church, Family and Trade Unions as against the State. And he rightly includes Protestant as well as Catholic organised efforts against authoritarianism, whether left or right. (shrink)

The latest offering in the highly successful Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, The Philosophy of Action features contributions from twelve leading figures in the field, including: Robert Audi, Michael Bratman, Donald Davidson, Wayne Davis, Harry Frankfurt, Carl Ginet, Gilbert Harman, Jennifer Hornsby, Jaegwon Kim, Hugh McCann, Paul Moser, and Brian O'Shaughnessy. Alfred Mele provides an introductory essay on the topics chosen and the questions they deal with. Topics addressed include intention, reasons for action, and the nature and explanation of (...) internal action. A selective bibliography is included as a guide to further reading. Comprehensive and up-to-date, this collection provides an accessible and stimulating introduction for readers interested in the philosophy of action, the philosophy of mind, and moral philosophy. (shrink)

Chomsky, N., Hegemonia albo przetrwanie. Amerykańskie dążenie do globalnej dominacji, [Przeł.] W. Turopolski, Warszawa: Studio „Emka”, 2005.

The mathematical background and content of Greek philosophy, by F. S. C. Northrop.--The one and the many in Plato, by R. Demos.--An introduction to the De modis significandi of Thomas of Erfurt, by S. Buchanan.--Truth by convention, by W. V. Quine.--Logical positivism and speculative philosophy, by H. S. Leonard.--The nature and status of time and passage, by P. Weiss.--Causality, by S. Kerby--iller.--The compound individual, by C. Hartshorne.--The good, by O. H. Lee.

We consider the extent to which certain properties of definably complete structures may persist in structures which are not definably complete, particularly in the weakly o-minimal structures.

We initiate an investigation of structures on the set of real numbers having the property that path components of definable sets are definable. All o-minimal structures on $(\mathbb {R},<)$ have the property, as do all expansions of $(\mathbb {R},+,\cdot,\mathbb {N})$. Our main analytic-geometric result is that any such expansion of $(\mathbb {R},<,+)$ by Boolean combinations of open sets (of any arities) either is o-minimal or defines an isomorph of $(\mathbb N,+,\cdot )$. We also show that any given expansion of $(\mathbb (...) {R}, <, +,\mathbb {N})$ by subsets of $\mathbb {N}^n$ (n allowed to vary) has the property if and only if it defines all arithmetic sets. Variations arise by considering connected components or quasicomponents instead of path components. (shrink)

Humanist sociologists are activists rooted in the reality of history and change and guided by a concern for the 'real life' problems of equality, peace, and social justice. They view people as active shapers of social life, capable of creating societies in which everyone's potential can unfold. Alfred McClung Lee introduces this volume with 'Sociology: Humanist and Scientific' and develops the theme that a sociology that is humanist is also scientific. The other nine selections are grouped into four parts: (...) 'The Individual and Social Life;' 'Social Institutions: Technology, Science, and Formal Organization;' 'Political Structures: Issues of Justice and Equality;' and 'Methodological Critiques and Counterproposals.'. (shrink)

Il problema della «nozione di responsabilità» che Alfred Schütz affronta in So­me Equivocations of the Notion of Responsability emerge sullo sfondo di una dimensione fenomenologica dell’azione morale. L’autore propone di di­stinguere internamente a questa nozione il punto di vista soggettivo e quello oggettivo, mettendo in luce come principi, norme, leggi e doveri morali assu­mano significato differente se riferiti alla coscienza individuale, in cui ven­gono autodeterminati ed elaborati, o se invece imposti dall’esterno. Giudicare ‘da se stessi’ la propria azione risulta (...) così su un piano etico di maggiore rile­van­za rispetto a quello in cui la responsabilità viene etero-determinata come ‘re­sponsabilità di qualcuno verso qualcosa’, quello in cui è soltanto il gruppo o l’au­torità, dall’esterno, a rendere un altro responsabile.The problem of the «notion of responsibility» which Alfred Schütz treats in So­me Equivocations of the Notion of Responsability comes out on the back­ground of a phenomenological size of the moral action. The author sug­gests distinguishing inside to this notion the subjective point of view and that one objective, sheding light upon as principles, rules, laws and moral duties grasp different meaning if ascribed to the individual conscience, in which are self-determined and elaborated, or if instead imposed from the outside. So ‘self-judgment’ on the action turns out on an ethical greater importance plan than that one in which the responsibility is hetero-determined as ‘responsibility of someone towards something’, that in which is only the group or the au­tho­rity, from the outside, to hold another person responsible. (shrink)

We study the notion of dp-minimality, beginning by providing several essential facts about dp-minimality, establishing several equivalent definitions for dp-minimality, and comparing dp-minimality to other minimality notions. The majority of the rest of the paper is dedicated to examples. We establish via a simple proof that any weakly o-minimal theory is dp-minimal and then give an example of a weakly o-minimal group not obtained by adding traces of externally definable sets. Next we give an example of a divisible ordered Abelian (...) group which is dp-minimal and not weakly o-minimal. Finally we establish that the field of p -adic numbers is dp-minimal. (shrink)

El editor reúne a distintos miembros de la Advisory Council of the British Humanist Association para escribir sobre conceptos, tales como la moralidad, la educación moral, la ética, los medios de comunicación, la muerte o el futuro. Algunos de estos autores son: Cyril Bibby, Raymond Firth, Margaret Knight, Lord Francis Williams, Antony Flew, Peter Henderson, James Hemming, Morris Ginsberg, Lord Ritchie-Calder, Lord Boyd Orr, Kathleen Nott, Brigid Brophy, Cristopher Longuet-Higgins, Kingsley Martin, P. Sargant Florence, Theodore Besterman, F.A.E. Crew, H.J. Eysenck (...) o Sir Karl Popper. (shrink)

W artykule zaprezentowano wybrane aforyzmy Stanisława Jerzego Leca, a niektóre z nich autor opatrzył filozoficznym komentarzem. Aforyzmy pogrupowano w siedem działów tematycznych: Wokół filozofii, Orientacja recentywistyczna, O Bogu, Religia, Sprawy ludzkie, Władza i totalitaryzm oraz O sobie samym. Celem niniejszego tekstu jest zatem z jednej strony popularyzacja aforyzmów Leca w środowisku naukowym, a z drugiej – pobudzenie do filozoficznej refleksji nad nimi.

This article critically examines recent work on free will and moral responsibility by Randolph Clarke, Robert Kane, and Timothy O’Connor in an attempt to clarify issues about control and luck that are central to the debate between libertarians (agent causationists and others) and their critics. It is argued that luck poses an as yet unresolved problem for libertarians.

Given a theoryTextending that of dense linear orders without endpoints, in a language ℒ ⊇ {<}, we are interested in extensionsT′ ofTin languages extending ℒ by unary relation symbols that are each interpreted in models ofT′ as sets that are both dense and codense in the underlying sets of the models.There is a canonically “wild” example, namelyT= Th andT′ = Th. Recall thatTis o-minimal, and so every open set definable in any model ofThas only finitely many definably connected components. But (...) it is well known that 〈ℝ, <, +, · ℚ 〉 defines every real Borel set, in particular, every open subset of any finite cartesian power of ℝ and every subset of any finite cartesian power of ℚ. To put this another way, the definable open sets in models ofTare essentially as simple as possible, whileT′ has a model where the definable open sets are as complicated as possible, as is the structure induced on the new predicate.In contrast to the preceding example, if ℝalgis the set of real algebraic numbers andT′ Th, then no model ofT′ defines any open set that is not definable in the underlying model ofT. (shrink)

Alfred Sohn-Rethel's Intellectual and Manual Labour is one of the major texts of post-war Marxist theory. A tremendous influence on the major writers of the Frankfurt School, with ongoing relevance to current debates about value, abstraction, and domination, Sohn-Rethel's ideas are here presented at their fullest scope and with their greatest theoretical clarity. Out of print for many years, this new Historical Materialism edition contains a new introduction by Chris O'Kane, an afterword by Chris Arthur, and a complete compilation (...) of the responses to Intellectual and Manual Labour published in the Italian journal Lotta Continua, including a substantial article by Antonio Negri. (shrink)

Kai-Fu Lee, który jest jednym z czołowych specjalistów od SI w Chinach, wyraził pogląd, że miłość jest tym, co istotnie odróżnia nas od SI oraz stanowi o naszym człowieczeństwie. Autor artykułu prezentuje filozoficzno-psychologiczne uzasadnienie dla tego poglądu Lee.

Artykuł omawia główne tezy słynnej książki Emil czyli o wychowaniu Jana Jakuba Rousseau. Poglądy Rousseau na wychowanie zostały porównane ze współczesnymi poglądami wychowawczymi i naukowymi. Niektóre tezy francuskiego myśliciela są aktualne także dzisiaj, ale do wielu należy podchodzić z ostrożnością, czy nawet je odrzucić.

Tras siglos de guerras descarnadas, los siete poderes que dividen la tierra se han diezmado unos a otros hasta alcanzar una difâicil tregua. Muy pocos reclamos legâitimos existen ya por el Trono de Hierro, y la guerra que ha convertido al mundo en poco mâas un desierto al fin ha terminado. O eso parece. No pasa mucho tiempo antes de que los sobrevivioentes, los proscritos, los renegados y los carroäneros de los Siete Reinos se reâunan. Ahora, como cuervos humanos que (...) acechan un banquete de cenizas, nuevas intrigas y peligrosas alianzas se forman, a la vez que rostros sorprendentes--algunos familiares, otros desconocidos--emergen de un siniestro crepâusculo de caos y luchas pasadas para sumir los desafâios de los terribles tiempos que se avecinan. Nobles y plebeyos, soldados y hechiceros, asesinos y sabios se unen para hacer valer su vida y sus fortunas. Porque en un festâin de cuervos, muchos son los invitados... pero sâolo unos pocos logran sobrevivir. -- Cover, p. [4]. (shrink)

Francis Fukuyama nie potrzebuje specjalnej prezentacji, ponieważ ten amerykański filozof polityczny zasłynął w świecie tezą o „końcu historii”. Autor omawia w artykule koncepcję thymos Fukuyamy, która została skrytykowana. Według autora, Fukuyama upraszcza rzeczywistość, kiedy z koncepcji thymos wywodzi przechodzenie państw do demokracji, co jest nieuzasadnione.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions METHODOLOGY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS: THE CASE OF PIERRE CHARRON Affanities, influences, borrowings, innovations, traditions, consistency--these are some of the key concepts of the time-honored and probably still dominant approach to the history of ideas. Scholars who seek to understand and interpret the philosophy and literature of the past in these terms tend to pay little attention to the social and institutional factors which constituted (...) the working conditions under which the ideas were conceived, articulated and disseminated; and it is precisely on those grounds that the traditional school has been increasingly challenged, over the past several decades, by historians (myself among others) who are convinced that, apart from their social context, the ideas themselves are virtually incomprehensible. A recent article on Pierre Charron by Maryanne Cline Horowitz may serve to illustrate some of the questions raised by these differences in method. At the close of her article, Horowitz explains the assumptions upon which she has conducted her investigation. Citing Peter Gay's interpretation of Ernst Cassirer, she affirms that "the critic begins the process of understanding a philosopher's work by searching for a dynamic center of thought. He must regard doctrines not as a series of discrete positions but as facets of a single point of view. The critic's equipment must therefore include the gift of empathy: he must sympathetically enter--indeed, relive---the thinker's world of ideas.''1 Following her own insight into the spirit of De la sagesse, and supporting it, of course, with a display of textual evidence, Horowitz argues that Richard Popkin was wrong to lay exclusive stress upon Charron's rejection of Aristotelian epistemology from the perspective of Pyrrhonian scepticism. "I think," she says, "that Charron's De la sagesse is based primarily on Stoic, rather than Sceptic principles." Although I agree in general with the main thrust of Popkin's thesis, I too have been critical of his failure to give sufficient weight to the neo-Stoic dements of Charron's thought. Hence it is not this conclusion to which I take exception.2 Charron has, from the very beginning, been found to have said a great many things and been subjected to a wide variety of interpretations. Horowitz emphasizes "the seeds of virtue and knowledge [as] the dynamic center of De la sagesse"--a view which may appear perfectly plausible to some readers. But it can never compel widespread conviction, for the simple reason that it is impossible for a twentieth-century critic to enter--unaided--into a world of ideas now part of a remote past. A book written nearly four centuries ago is not immediately perspicuous. Before trying on our neo-idealist wings and taking flight into the empyrean of late Renaissance moral treatises, we would do well to explore as many as possible of the following questions: Just who was our author? For whom did he write? Who x p. Gay, Introduction to E. Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Bloomington, 1963), p. 22, cited by M. C. Horowitz, "Pierre Charron's View of the Source of Wisdom," Journal o! the History of Philosophy, IX, 4 (October, 1971), 457. 2 A. Soman, "Pierre Charron: A Revaluation," BibliothOque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, XXXII (January, 1970), 57 n. 3. [495] 496 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY in fact did read him? and how did his readers react? And what did our author think of their reactions.'?s Horowitz does not, apparently, give high priority to such questions. For rhetorical purposes, she readily agrees with Eugene Rice that "Pierre Charron's De la sagesse is the most important Renaissance treatise on wisdom." (Important to whom? and from what point of view? The criteria are not at all clear.) She assumes that Charron's epistemology was consistent, and that the second edition of 1604 represents a clarification of, or advance over, the first edition of 1601. (There is no historical evidence for making either assumption.) And she does not seem to entertain the possibility that Popkin could still be right about the impact of Charron's Pyrrhonian scepticism on the libertins Jrudits, although Charron may never in fact have been a Pyrrhonian sceptic.4 These are... (shrink)